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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

LIGHTS, CAMERA, STATE ACTION: MANHATTAN
COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. V. HALLECK
Graham L. Fisher†

“I am continuing to monitor the censorship of AMERICAN CITIZENS on
social media platforms. This is the United States of America—and we have what’s
known as FREEDOM OF SPEECH! We are monitoring and watching, closely!!”
—President Donald J. Trump1
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INTRODUCTION
On May 28, 2020, President Trump signed an executive order to
combat what he perceived as “[o]nline platforms . . . engaging in
selective censorship.”2 Issued two days after Twitter’s labeling of his

2 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020) (speculating that “[t]he growth
of online platforms in recent years raises important questions about applying the ideals of the First
Amendment to modern communications technology”).
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tweets regarding mail-in ballots3 as containing “unsubstantiated
claim[s],”4 this order represented a marked reversal from his previous
views regarding what he perceived to be overly expansive First
Amendment protections.5 The suggestion that this could be a First
Amendment issue appeared unfounded, as Justice Kavanaugh had
recently written the majority opinion in Manhattan Community Access
Corp. v. Halleck,6 a decision that largely foreclosed the possibility of First
Amendment claims against platforms such as Twitter. Although the
substance of the executive order7 related to § 230(c) of the
Communications Decency Act,8 the message the President was sending
was clear: First Amendment requirements should apply to content
providers, precedent be damned.9
It is a well-established rule that constitutional constraints governing
public entities do not extend to private actors10—until they do.11 If this
3 Two of the President’s tweets were flagged with a link to “[g]et the facts about mail-in
ballots.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 8:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1265255835124539392
[https://perma.cc/9ARKT5HW] (“There is NO WAY (ZERO!) that Mail-In Ballots will be anything less than substantially
fraudulent. Mail boxes will be robbed, ballots will be forged & even illegally printed out &
fraudulently signed. The Governor of California is sending Ballots to millions of people,
anyone. . . . .”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 8:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1265255845358645254
[https://perma.cc/L5LASBKK] (“. . . .living in the state, no matter who they are or how they got there, will get one. That
will be followed up with professionals telling all of these people, many of whom have never even
thought of voting before, how, and for whom, to vote. This will be a Rigged Election. No way!”).
4 Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim that Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to Voter Fraud,
TWITTER (May 26, 2020), https://twitter.com/i/events/1265330601034256384 [https://perma.cc/
7NP4-GUB7]. In the days following the 2020 presidential election, over one third of Trump’s
tweets were flagged. Bethany Dawson, More Than a Third of Trump’s Tweets Have Been Flagged
for Disinformation Since Election Day, INDEP. (Nov. 7, 2020 10:01 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/trump-tweetmisinformation-twitter-b1672933.html [https://perma.cc/KPW3-TBHR].
5 Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Renews Pledge to ‘Take a Strong Look’ at Libel Laws, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/business/media/trump-libellaws.html [https://perma.cc/GZ54-P6Y7] (“‘We are going to take a strong look at our country’s
libel laws, so that when somebody says something that is false and defamatory about someone, that
person will have meaningful recourse in our courts,’ Mr. Trump said . . . .”).
6 Manhattan Cmty Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
7 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020) (directing several agency heads
to petition the FCC to clarify § 230 of the Communications Decency Act).
8 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018).
9 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883) (holding that in the context of
the Fourteenth Amendment, “[i]t is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper
and broader scope”).
11 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that a town owned by a
corporation could be liable for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, despite being private
property).
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principle seems unclear, it is largely due to the piecemeal jurisprudence
that defines the “state action” doctrine.12 This doctrine applies when
courts hold that a private actor is subject to constitutional constraints by
virtue of the quasi-public role they have willingly accepted.13 In these
situations, constitutional protections—and the resulting 42 U.S.C. § 1983
actions—may be available to those who demand relief.14 While questions
of what entails a “state action” loom in the face of closely intertwined
private and public actors, Halleck simplifies the inquiry15 with an updated
definition of the types of private functions that now qualify as state
action.16
Under the revised doctrine, constitutional protections are only
afforded when private action is of a “traditional, exclusive” public
nature.17 This narrowed scope will likely reduce frivolous litigation but
will also usher in unwanted side effects.18 Specifically, the Halleck
decision failed to account for the increased role that private entities have
in the public sphere.19 This uncertain future, coupled with the Court
splitting along a partisan 5-4 line—further politicizing the doctrine20—
leaves one wondering if it was correctly decided. Justices Kavanaugh and
Sotomayor disagreed about the facts of the case and reached very
different conclusions about how to apply past precedent in the face of
these divergent possibilities.21 What should have been an easy case—at

12 For a brief discussion on many of the previous state action cases see generally Manhattan
Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1929 (2019) (outlining a series of previous
Supreme Court decisions that constituted the state action doctrine).
13 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
15 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928-29 (“Under this Court’s cases, a private entity can qualify as a
state actor in a few limited circumstances—including, for example, (i) when the private entity
performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government compels the private
entity to take a particular action; or (iii) when the government acts jointly with the private entity.”
(internal citations omitted)).
16 Id. at 1930 (“In short, merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public
function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First Amendment
constraints.”).
17 Id. This phrase is repeated eleven times throughout the opinion. See generally id.
18 Id. at 1945 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Even so, the majority’s focus on Jackson [v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)] still risks sowing confusion among the lower courts
about how and when government outsourcing will render any abuses that follow beyond the reach
of the Constitution.”).
19 See infra Section IV.B.
20 One of the previous controlling cases, Jackson, 419 U.S. 345, had a conservative tilt but was
not split exactly on party lines as Justice Blackmun joined the majority.
21 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court tells a very reasonable
story about a case that is not before us.”).
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least in the eyes of the district court applying the previous standard22—
instead became another step in the Court’s conservative realignment. As
Justice Stevens wryly noted in a footnote to Burnham v. Superior Court,23
“[p]erhaps the adage about hard cases making bad law should be revised
to cover easy cases.”24
This Case Note argues that under the new standard, situations may
arise where public actors can divest themselves of certain activities in
order to circumvent constitutional protections traditionally afforded to
their conduct. This Case Note proceeds in five parts. Part I summarizes
the background and prior caselaw which formed Halleck’s backbone.25
Part II discusses the procedural history of Halleck, leading to the battle
before the Supreme Court.26 Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s
decision, including Justice Sotomayor’s scathing dissent.27 Finally, Part
IV discusses the implications of the decision, and what can be expected
from a Court keen to whittle away at an already weakened doctrine.28
I. BACKGROUND & PRIOR LAW
Under § 1983, plaintiffs can seek recourse against a non-federal
entity when they have been deprived of their civil rights.29 As the
Constitution does not apply to private actors, this cause of action is
extremely limited and can typically only be used when the deprivation of

22 The district court conceded that there was no clear precedent as to whether a public access
channel was a public forum, but after examining the precedent concluded that the state action
requirement was not met. Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(“In short, because Plaintiffs cannot establish that MNN was operating a public forum, they fail to
plead that MNN was a state actor under Section 1983. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
claim is dismissed.”).
23 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
24 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
25 See infra Part I.
26 See infra Part II.
27 See infra Part III.
28 See infra Part IV.
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress . . . .”). The remedy available for federal violations is the Bivens action, a cause of action
that has seen its availability to wronged parties narrow since not long after its inception. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (refusing to extend Bivens remedies to cross-border
shootings).
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civil rights has been perpetrated by a public entity.30 This was confirmed
in 1883 when the Supreme Court held in United States v. Stanley31 that
there was a “state action” requirement for claims regarding deprivation
of civil rights, and that the government had to be involved in the
deprivation for a claim to proceed.32 The definition of what exactly
constitutes “state action” has evolved throughout the twentieth century,
and a series of cases have expanded the doctrine to encompass instances
where private entities stepped into the types of roles traditionally taken
on by the government.33
A.

Early History of the State Action Doctrine

The Supreme Court shaped the state action doctrine with several
decisions determining the type of private conduct that may subject a
private actor to a civil rights claim.34 Beginning in 1927, the Supreme
Court decided a sequence of cases regarding political party primary
elections. The first case, Nixon v. Herndon,35 does not directly implicate
the doctrine, but lays the groundwork for future cases.36 In Nixon, the
Supreme Court held that a Texas law preventing eligible voters from
voting in the Texas Democratic Party’s primary on the basis of race was
unconstitutional.37 In response, Texas passed a statute allowing political
parties to determine who was eligible to vote in their primaries.38
Accordingly, in 1932, the Texas Democratic Party once again found itself
in the Supreme Court defending its racist policies.39 The new statute
effectively had the same impact as the previous one, but rather than
30 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 485 (1953) (Minton, J., dissenting) (“For, after all,
this Court has power to redress a wrong under [the Fifteenth] Amendment only if the wrong is done
by the State. That has been the holding of this Court since the earliest cases.”); Kevin L. Cole,
Federal and State “State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24
GA. L. REV. 327, 329–31 (1990).
31 United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
32 Id. at 52 (“In the absence of State laws or State action adverse to such rights and privileges,
the nation may not actively interfere for their protection and security, even against corporations and
individuals exercising public or quasi-public functions.”).
33 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1929 (2019) (listing a series of
cases regarding state action).
34 Id.
35 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
36 The case dealt primarily with a challenge to Texas law which would allow for violations of
the Fifteenth Amendment, rather than a specific entity’s liability. Id.
37 Id. at 540-41 (“The important question is whether the statute can be sustained. But although
we state it as a question the answer does not seem to us open to a doubt. We find it unnecessary to
consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and
obvious infringement of the Fourteenth.”).
38 See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81–82 (1932).
39 Id.
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directly authorizing racial discrimination, it passed the power to
discriminate to the political parties, which were free to set the
requirements for voting in their primaries.40 The Court once again held
that this scheme was unlawful, and the Texas Democratic Party had
impermissibly discriminated against potential voters when it prevented
someone from voting in the primary on the basis of race alone.41
This was, regretfully, not the conclusion of discrimination by the
Texas Democratic Party, whose scheme of withholding absentee ballots
on the basis of race was upheld in the 1935 decision, Grovey v.
Townsend.42 The victory was short-lived; nine years later the Court
overturned Grovey and held that a Democratic primary restricting
participation based on race was prohibited under the Fifteenth
Amendment.43 In the absence of an enabling statute by the Texas
legislature, the Court held that racial discrimination was impermissible—
even by a private party—when it arose from activities that had
traditionally been administered by the state, such as elections.44 The Party
had effectively become a state actor by administering the election, and
therefore had to comply with all of the constitutional requirements that a
public election would face.45 In 1953, the Court held once more that the
Fifteenth Amendment applied to a private political party conducting
elections that restricted membership based on race.46 Foreshadowing the
future narrowing of the doctrine, Justice Minton dissented as he did not
believe the actions of a private political party constituted state action.47
In the 1946 Marsh v. Alabama48 decision, the Court explored the
concept of state action as it related to the freedom of speech in an artificial
public square. In Marsh, the plaintiff, Grace Marsh, handed out religious
40

Id.
Id. at 89 (“With the problem thus laid bare and its essentials exposed to view, the case is seen
to be ruled by Nixon v. Herndon . . . . Delegates of the State’s power have discharged their official
functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black.”).
42 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (holding that a failure to provide an absentee ballot
for a party primary on the basis of race did not constitute state action).
43 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659-66 (1944) (noting that the Grovey Court considered
the discrimination to be a lawful determination of party membership, rather than a violation of the
Constitution).
44 Id. at 663-66.
45 Id. at 664 (“If the state requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a general election
ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and limits the choice of the electorate in general
elections for state offices, practically speaking, to those whose names appear on such a ballot, it
endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination against Negroes, practiced by a party entrusted by
Texas law with the determination of the qualifications of participants in the primary. This is state
action within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
46 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
47 Id. at 490-91, 494 (Minton, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority as the actions taken
by the party did not rise to the level of what he considers state action).
48 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505–09 (1946).
41
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materials in what appeared to a public area of town.49 She was
subsequently arrested per an Alabama trespassing law.50 Yet, the town
was owned entirely by a corporation, and none of the land was a public
space.51 The Court held that because the land was open to the public, and
was in no way restricted by the company owning the property, it had
effectively been transformed into a public square.52 Accordingly, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments would apply to the company’s conduct,
which abridged Marsh’s speech.53
B.

Justice Rehnquist Turns the Tide

In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
which became the controlling case governing state action claims
against a private actor. The controversy arose when a privately-owned
utility company—chartered by the state of Pennsylvania—turned off a
customer’s power due to continued nonpayment.55 The plaintiff,
Catherine Jackson, sued the power company on the theory that by turning
off power without a hearing, it had deprived her of the rights guaranteed
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 ThenAssociate Justice Rehnquist wrote in a 6-3 decision that the State of
Pennsylvania was not connected to the respondent’s actions to the extent
that disabling one’s utilities without a pre-deprivation hearing would be
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.57
Justice Douglas’s dissent in Jackson warned of a future where a
public entity could act “in cahoots” with a private group, and thus allow
that private group to “perpetrate an injury” with limited recourse, at least
as far as the Constitution was concerned.58 Douglas believed that the
Co.,54

49

Id. at 503.
Id. at 503–04.
51 Id. at 504.
52 Id. at 507–08.
53 Id. (“Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town, the public in either
case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels
of communication remain free. As we have heretofore stated, the town of Chickasaw does not
function differently from any other town.”).
54 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
55 Id. at 346–47.
56 Id. at 347–48.
57 Id. at 358–59 (“[T]he State of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with respondent’s
action in terminating petitioner’s service so as to make respondent’s conduct in so doing attributable
to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
58 Id. at 363–64 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Section 1983 was designed to give citizens a federal
forum for civil rights complaints wherever, by direct or indirect actions, a State, acting ‘in cahoots’
with a private group or through neglect or listless oversight, allows a private group to perpetrate an
50
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majority opinion would pave the way for the government to coordinate
with a private entity in order to circumvent constitutional protections.59
Justice Marshall wrote a separate dissent, writing that the electric
company had become too closely intertwined with the state for its
activities to not constitute state action.60 Therefore, the majority’s
decision in Jackson represented a serious departure from previous state
action jurisprudence.61
C.

Justice Rehnquist Changes the Game

Two years later, Justice Rehnquist applied his logic from the
Jackson decision to narrow the state action doctrine once more.62 In
Flagg Bros., the Court held that a warehouse threatening to sell
furniture—taken during an eviction—due to nonpayment (pursuant to
New York law) was not state action.63 The case arose when the plaintiff,
Shirley Brooks, was evicted from her apartment in Mount Vernon, New
York, and her furniture was taken to a warehouse owned by Flagg
Brothers, Inc. under the direction of the sheriff.64 Based on Brooks’s
nonpayment, Flagg Brothers threatened to sell Brooks’s furniture to
recoup their losses.65 The Second Circuit held that executing a lien had
traditionally been a function of the sheriff, and therefore, the state action
requirement was met.66 On appeal, Justice Rehnquist disagreed, and
reversed the Second Circuit’s decision,67 finding that very few actions
were exclusively reserved to the government.68 Despite the warehouse
effectively stepping in for the government to enforce the lien, Justice
Rehnquist once again narrowed the state action doctrine.69
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Flagg Bros. presents a very different
view of the case before the Court.70 Invoking Jackson, Justice Marshall
injury. The theory is that, in those cozy situations, local politics and the pressure of economic
overlords on subservient state agencies make recovery in state courts unlikely.”).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have consistently indicated that state
authorization and approval of ‘private’ conduct would support a finding of state action.”).
61 See generally id.
62 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 153.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 154-55 (citing Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 553 F.2d 764, 770–71 (2d Cir. 1977)).
67 Id. at 157 (“Thus, the only issue presented by this case is whether Flagg Brothers’ action
may fairly be attributed to the State of New York. We conclude that it may not.”).
68 Id. at 158 (noting that “[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by
governments, very few have been ‘exclusively reserved to the State’”).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 167 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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addressed the difficulty in determining what constitutes a power
“traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”71 Justice Marshall
argued in favor of the view endorsed by the Second Circuit, which held
that the execution of a lien has traditionally and exclusively been
performed by a sheriff.72 When Flagg Brothers threatened to execute the
lien, they were acting in place of the sheriff.73 Therefore, the state action
requirement was met.
D.

The Court Remains Undecided About Public Access Channels

One of the first nationwide attempts to mandate the creation of
public access channels came from FCC rulemaking, which required
television providers—such as cable companies—with more than 3,500
subscribers to provide a public access channel.74 When a cable provider
challenged the FCC’s authority to promulgate such a rule, the Supreme
Court initially upheld the regulation as a proper use of the agency’s
power.75 Several years later, a second decision featuring the same parties
largely overturned the first.76 Writing for the majority, Justice White held
that although the FCC had the power to establish this regulation under the
Communications Act of 1934,77 it could not regulate cable companies as
common carriers.78 Therefore, the rule requiring carriers to broadcast
public access channels was struck down.79 In response, Congress
amended the Communications Act with the new provisions authorizing
states to direct cable franchisees to create public access channels.80 The
providers of these channels would have no editorial control over the
content, so long as the material being broadcast was not obscene.81
71

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 167–68 (quoting Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 713-14 (N.Y.
1973)).
73 Id. at 168 (“By ignoring this history, the Court approaches the question before us as if it can
be decided without reference to the role that the State has always played in lien execution by forced
sale. In so doing, the Court treats the State as if it were, to use the Court’s words, ‘a monolithic,
abstract concept hovering in the legal stratosphere.’ . . . The state-action doctrine, as developed in
our past cases, requires that we come down to earth and decide the issue here with careful attention
to the State’s traditional role.” (internal citation omitted)).
74 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a) (1970) (revised as 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1973), repealed at 39 Fed.
Reg. 43,302 (1974)); United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest I), 406 U.S. 649, 672 (1972).
75 Midwest I, 406 U.S. at 672.
76 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
77 Pub. L. No. 75-97, 50 Stat. 189 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–646 (2018)).
78 Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 703-04, 708–09.
79 Id. at 708-09.
80 Cable Communications Policy (Cable) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2782
(codified as 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988)).
81 See Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
72
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In 1996, the Supreme Court addressed whether a public access
channel constituted a public forum in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.82 In Denver Area, a
plurality of the court led by Justice Breyer held that a cable provider
censoring certain content it deemed inappropriate was not state action.83
The Court fell short of reversing the D.C. Circuit’s decision and held that
public access channels were public forums.84 In his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy strongly disagreed with the majority’s decision not to address
the matter of state action.85 In his—and Justice Ginsburg’s—view, a
public access channel is a public forum, and therefore meets the state
action requirement required for the suit to proceed.86
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF HALLECK
A.

Background

Under New York regulations, cable operators of a certain size must
provide a public access channel.87 As outlined by the Cable Act, these
public access channels are prohibited from exercising any editorial
control over the content, apart from the same limited exceptions
surrounding obscene (and other unprotected) speech.88 After entering into
a franchise agreement with Time Warner, the Manhattan borough
president assigned control of the public access channel to Manhattan
Neighborhood Network (MNN), operated by Manhattan Community
Access Corp.89 According to the New York regulation, material must be
broadcast on a first-come, first-served basis, and the channel could only

82

Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737-42 (1996).
Id. at 737.
84 Id. at 733 (“We conclude that the first provision—which permits the operator to decide
whether or not to broadcast such programs on leased access channels—is consistent with the First
Amendment.”); id. at 737.
85 Id. at 780-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in
part).
86 Id. at 783 (“Access channels, however, are property of the cable operator, dedicated or
otherwise reserved for programming of other speakers or the government. A public access channel
is a public forum, and laws requiring leased access channels create common-carrier obligations.
When the government identifies certain speech on the basis of its content as vulnerable to exclusion
from a common carrier or public forum, strict scrutiny applies.”).
87 Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
88 Id. (limiting the editorial decisions a public access station may make to “measures as may be
authorized by Federal or State law to prohibit obscenity or other content unprotected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution” (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16,
§ 895.4(c)(8)–(9))).
89 Id. at 239-40.
83
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exercise extremely limited editorial control to prohibit unprotected
speech.90
B.

Bad Blood Boils, “Barrio” Beef Brings Ban

Although the station was designated for use by anyone in the
community, problematic figures soon emerged, and tensions grew
between MNN and community activists DeeDee Halleck and Jesus
Papoleto Melendez.91 For instance, in 2011 Halleck was prevented from
attending a board meeting when she was “locked out” by the staff.92 In
2012, a separate argument led to the MNN station director throwing
papers at Melendez.93 After not being invited to a gala held for the
station’s donors at a new building close to where Melendez lived, the pair
produced a film critical of the station, titled: “The 1% Visits El Barrio;
Whose Community?”94 Despite pushback from the station to prevent it
from being broadcast, the film was aired on MNN several months later.95
As the film was a direct attack on the station and its employees, Halleck
received a temporary suspension, and Melendez received a lifetime
suspension from airing any further content on the station.96 Even after
Halleck’s ban was lifted, she was unable to re-air the film—despite the
first-come, first-served policy—owing to Melendez’s lifetime ban.97
Halleck and Melendez sued both New York City and MNN in
federal court, alleging that MNN had violated their First Amendment
rights when they were prevented from both airing their film and utilizing
the station’s resources.98 The district court dismissed the First
Amendment claim against the City, as the City itself was too far removed
from the process of banning the content to be liable.99 This would
typically end the suit due to the state action requirement of a First
Amendment claim, as MNN is a private entity.100 However, the plaintiffs

90

Id. at 240.
Id. at 240-42.
92 S.M., The Supreme Court Takes a Public-Access TV Case, ECONOMIST (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2018/10/17/the-supreme-court-takes-apublic-access-tv-case [https://perma.cc/K5ZP-M7AW].
93 Id.
94 DeeDee Halleck, The 1% Visits El Barrio; Whose Community?, YOUTUBE (July 29, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEbMTGEQ1xc [https://perma.cc/2LC8-GZZ8]. The trial
court referred to the film as “The 1% Visits the Barrio.” Halleck, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 241.
95 DeeDee Halleck, supra note 94; S.M., supra note 92.
96 Halleck, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 241–42.
97 Id. at 242.
98 Id. at 239.
99 Id. at 243 (citing Jersawitz v. People TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1999)).
100 See id.
91
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alleged that MNN was effectively a state actor, as the public access
channel was a public forum.101 The court discussed several prior cases,102
and ultimately rejected this argument, concluding that MNN was not a
state actor.103 Accordingly, the First Amendment claims the plaintiffs
brought against MNN were not actionable.104
C.

The Second Circuit Disagrees

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal
in favor of MNN.105 Citing heavily from Denver Area, the Second Circuit
wrote that a public access channel was a public forum, and remanded the
case for further proceedings.106 Specifically, they adopted Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Denver Area that a public access channel is
effectively the electronic equivalent of a public square.107 Therefore, it
would constitute a public forum when applying the state action
doctrine.108 The court noted that lower courts were split as to whether a
public access channel was a public forum, and that the D.C. Circuit had
already held that it was not.109 Although the D.C. Circuit case had been
partially overturned in Denver Area, Justice Breyer declined to comment
on whether a public access channel was a public forum.110 Therefore, this
portion of the ruling was intact at the time of the Second Circuit decision.
The Second Circuit, however, agreed with the district court that the City
was too far removed from the action, and therefore, they upheld the
dismissal in favor of New York City.111
Judge Jacobs concurred with the judgment that the City was not
liable for the plaintiffs’ claims but dissented with regards to MNN.112 He
specifically disagreed with the majority’s view that a public access
101 Id. at 244 (arguing that “the regulation of free speech in a public forum is a traditional and
exclusive public function”).
102 Id. at 245 (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996)).
103 Id. at 247 (“In short, because Plaintiffs cannot establish that MNN was operating a public
forum, they fail to plead that MNN was a state actor under Section 1983.”).
104 Id. at 239.
105 Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 301-02 (2d Cir. 2018).
106 Id. (citing Denver Area, 518 U.S. 727).
107 Id. at 306 (citing Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 793-94) (“A public access channel is the
electronic version of the public square.”).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 307-08 (citing All. for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996)).
110 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 749.
111 Halleck, 882 F.3d at 308.
112 Id. at 309-10 (Jacobs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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channel is a public forum.113 As such, MNN could not be a state actor.114
He also speculated that the Denver Area Court would have likely not
found a public access channel to be a public forum had the majority
chosen to discuss the issue.115 Noting that only Justice Ginsburg had
joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, he reasoned that it was not
appropriate for the Second Circuit to endorse the view taken by a minority
of the Supreme Court when it was likely that the full Court would not
have agreed.116 This concurrence was an interesting signal that future
appeals might be decided on traditionally partisan lines, as the judges in
favor of state action were appointed by democrats, whereas Judge Jacobs
was appointed by George H.W. Bush.117
D.

A Newly Elevated Justice Kavanaugh Comes to MNN’s Rescue

The Second Circuit’s decision widening the state action doctrine
triggered a split between the Second and D.C. Circuits, as the D.C.
Circuit’s previous holding that public access channels did not qualify as
state actors was not reversed by the Denver Area Court.118 Despite being
decided in 1992, the Court’s composition in Denver Area119 offered
limited, though valuable, insight on how the Court might decide Halleck,
should certiorari have been granted in early 2018. Of the Denver Area
Court Justices still on the bench in 2018, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg
were strongly in favor of a public access channel being a public forum,
while Justice Thomas was strongly opposed.120 Justice Breyer was
undecided on the matter in Denver Area, as the majority declined to
comment on the D.C. Circuit’s determination.121 It appears from the votes
for Justice Thomas’s dissent opposing a finding of state action—which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia—that the notion
that a public access channel is not a public forum subject to First
Amendment protections is generally in line with conservative

113

Id. at 312.
Id. at 311-12.
115 Id. at 313.
116 Id.
117 Second Circuit Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SECOND CIR., http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/
judges/judges.html [https://perma.cc/6K6Q-Z6HK] (showing the years each judge was appointed
to the court).
118 All. for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
119 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 727–31.
120 See generally id.
121 Id. at 749 (“For three reasons, however, it is unnecessary, indeed, unwise, for us definitively
to decide whether or how to apply the public forum doctrine to leased access channels.”).
114
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jurisprudence, which strongly favors deregulation.122 As Justice Kennedy
felt otherwise, an early case similar to Halleck might have been decided
5-4 in favor of the plaintiffs, with Kennedy acting as the swing vote.123
While this might have made for an interesting possibility (that is, yet
another “conservative” case where Kennedy breaks from his party’s
traditional views), any potential hope of a victory via this path was lost
on June 27, 2018, when Justice Kennedy announced his retirement.124 At
the first Supreme Court conference following Justice Kavanaugh’s
confirmation, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to MNN’s appeal.125
E.

A Skeptical Justice Breyer Makes the Case About Hot Dogs

Towards the start of the arguments Justice Breyer was quick to
become involved in questioning, though his inquiry seemed tangential at
times. For instance, he asked a series of questions regarding the editorial
control a station may exercise over programing related to hot dogs.126
During these arguments, MNN argued that although the station’s content
is typically broadcast on a first-come, first-served basis, the channel does
exercise some editorial discretion when required.127 For instance, it
reserves the right to adjust the programing schedule based on both the
suitability of the content in a specific time slot and the relevance of the
content as it relates to other programming.128 This is contrary to the New

122 S.L.S., Comment, Pluralism on the Bench: Understanding Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1182, 1192 (1997).
123 Despite being a common occurrence, Justice Kennedy disliked the notion that he was the
Court’s swing vote. Bill Hutchinson & Stephanie Ebbs, Anthony Kennedy, Crucial Supreme Court
Swing Vote, Retiring After 3 Decades, ABCNEWS (June 27, 2018, 3:17 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/supreme-court-justice-anthony-kennedy-retiring/story?id=55052718
[https://perma.cc/DKZ9-K47T] (“While Kennedy became known for his so-called ‘swing votes,’
he hated the term.”).
124 Letter from Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Supreme Court of the U.S., to President
Donald J. Trump (June 27, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/
Letter_to_the_President_June27.pdf [https://perma.cc/376C-F5KF].
125 Amy Howe, Justices Take on One New Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 12, 2018, 3:52 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/justices-take-on-one-new-case
[https://perma.cc/4KKUE9CS].
126 Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–25, Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct.
1921 (2019) (No. 17-1702) [hereinafter Halleck Transcript] (“You see, I have a simple factual
question. Tomorrow I want to go and interrupt somebody who’s in the subway discussion. As soon
as he’s finished, I want to discuss New York and hot dogs, okay?”). After dominating much of
MNN’s time during oral arguments, Justice Breyer did not contribute to either the opinion or
dissent, despite having authored the majority opinion in Denver Area. See generally Halleck
Transcript; Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
127 Halleck Transcript, supra note 126, at 26.
128 Id.
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York State’s authorizing regulation, under which a station may exercise
almost no editorial control over the content.129
During her line of questioning, Justice Sotomayor distinguished
what she perceived the facts of the case to be with the cases petitioners
relied on in support of their proposition.130 Telegraphing her dissent, she
questioned whether any past cases were relevant.131 In her view, past
cases should not apply, as the state seemed to have specifically designated
the channel as a public forum, and therefore precedent did not matter, as
MNN had agreed to those terms.132 Newly elevated Justice Kavanaugh
appeared to take a dim view of the idea that MNN was a public forum.
He interrupted the respondent’s attorney to note that in order for there to
be state action, the activity must be something that has “traditionally[,]
exclusively been a public function.”133 He pushed back on the idea that
operating a channel would entail a public function and likened it more to
a utility.134 Accordingly, under the logic presented by Justice Kavanaugh,
the station would not pass the public function test, despite being regulated
under the New York statue.135
The respondents also confirmed that the basis for it being a public
forum is that it must accept content on a first-come, first-served basis; if
the channel had discretion, then it would not be a public forum.136
Specifically, a similar authorizing statute in California does not have the
same requirement,137 and therefore, it would not be a public forum under
this test.138 By the conclusion of oral arguments, some Justices, such as
Kavanagh and Sotomayor, had made their views and votes clear.139
Despite being so vocal during the arguments, Justice Breyer was far more
inscrutable.140

129

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 895.4 (2020).
Halleck Transcript, supra note 126, at 27-28.
131 Id. (Sotomayor, J.) (“But none of those cases involved the state or the government
designating something a public forum. They’ve involved traditional public forums. That’s a
different issue.”).
132 Id. at 27–28.
133 Id. at 39–40.
134 Id. at 41-42.
135 Id. at 42.
136 Id. at 46.
137 Although the specific California statute was not mentioned during oral argument, see id. at
48, the California statute governing the creation public access channels is silent on whether content
must be first-come, first-served. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5870 (West 2020).
138 Halleck Transcript, supra note 126, at 48.
139 See generally id.
140 Id.
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III. ANALYSIS OF HALLECK
A.

The First Amendment Applies to Only Government Action, Not
Private Entities

In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Kavanaugh (joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch), the Court held
that MNN—and by extension, any public access channel—is not a state
actor simply because it broadcasts content to the public.141 At the outset
of the majority opinion, Justice Kavanaugh invoked the longstanding
precedent that constitutional protections only apply to actions taken by
government actors, rather than private individuals.142 Borrowing heavily
from then-Justice Rehnquist’s language in Jackson,143 the Court
announced a bright-line test to define when private conduct qualifies as
state action: the new inquiry asks whether the activity in question
constitutes “a traditional, exclusive public function.”144 This exact
phrase, punctuation and all, appears eleven times in the majority opinion
and serves as a clear indication that this is the new test lower courts
should use to examine state action.145 Although Jackson used similar
language, such as “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State,”146 this is the first time the exact phrase “traditional, exclusive
public function” has been used.147 Justice Kavanaugh’s adherence and
141 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019) (“Under the stateaction doctrine as it has been articulated and applied by our precedents, we conclude that operation
of public access channels on a cable system is not a traditional, exclusive public function.
Moreover, a private entity such as MNN who opens its property for speech by others is not
transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.”); id. at 1928 (“The producers have advanced a
First Amendment claim against MNN. The threshold problem with that First Amendment claim is
a fundamental one: MNN is a private entity.”); id. at 1930 (“[A]ccording to the producers, operation
of a public forum for speech is a traditional, exclusive public function. That analysis mistakenly
ignores the threshold state-action question.”); id. at 1932 (“Here, therefore, the City’s designation
of MNN to operate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable system does not make MNN
a state actor.”).
142 Id. at 1926.
143 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (“We have, of course, found state
action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State.”).
144 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1926.
145 Id. (repeating the importance of an action being a “traditional, exclusive public function”).
146 419 U.S. at 352.
147 Although similar language appears in several other decisions relating to state action, the
inclusion of the comma seems to be a new development. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 294 (2001) (“It said the District Court was mistaken in
seeing a symbiotic relationship between the State and the Association, it emphasized that the
Association was neither engaging in a traditional and exclusive public function nor responding to
state compulsion, and it gave short shrift to the language from Tarkanian on which the District
Court relied.”).

182

LIGHTS, CAMERA, STATE ACTION

[2020

further development of Rehnquist’s opinion in Jackson sends a clear
message of his reverence for the late Chief Justice’s jurisprudence.148
Clearer still is his message that as the role of government continues to
evolve, indications of state action will remain stagnant.149
B.

No State Action, as Public Access Channels Are Not a
“Traditional, Exclusive Public Function”

Justice Kavanaugh next discussed three situations where state action
by a private actor can be found.150 The first arises when a public actor
meets the aforementioned “traditional, exclusive public function”
inquiry.151 The second arises “when the government compels [a] private
entity to take a particular action.”152 The third arises “when the
“government acts jointly with the private entity.”153 Because the latter
two types of activity were not alleged by the plaintiffs, the only possible
option that could be met was the first—MNN could be liable for a § 1983
action under the theory that it had taken on a function traditionally and
exclusively carried out by the government.154 Justice Kavanaugh
concluded that because public access channels are neither traditionally
nor exclusively a government function, there is no merit to the plaintiff’s
claim, and MNN could not be liable for a deprivation of the plaintiff’s
civil rights.155
Furthermore, MNN’s establishment of a public forum was not
enough to satisfy the requirements of state action.156 The majority noted
that although providing a public forum is traditionally a government
function, it is not exclusive to public entities.157 There are many situations
where a private actor may create a public forum—such as a comedy club
hosting an open mic night, or a grocery store hanging a bulletin board—

148

Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928–29.
Id. (“It is not enough that the federal, state, or local government exercised the function in the
past, or still does. And it is not enough that the function serves the public good or the public interest
in some way. Rather, to qualify as a traditional, exclusive public function within the meaning of
our state-action precedents, the government must have traditionally and exclusively performed the
function.”).
150 Id. at 1928.
151 Id. (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-54).
152 Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982)).
153 Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941–42 (1982)).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1929 (“The relevant function in this case is operation of public access channels on a
cable system. That function has not traditionally and exclusively been performed by government.”).
156 Id. at 1930.
157 Id.
149

2020]

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

183

but may still be able to restrict the content as it sees fit.158 The majority
warned that should these examples constitute state action, private
property owners could be subject to unlimited First Amendment
liability.159 Although New York City may have authorized the creation of
the station, this would be no different than if the City had simply licensed
it as part of a regulatory scheme.160 Further, the Court previously held
that a regulatory scheme does not constitute state action.161 If the Court
overruled past precedent to endorse the view that merely complying with
licensing constituted state action, administrability problems could
abound.162 For instance, private actors restricting the content of a bulletin
board would constitute a deprivation of civil rights.163 The majority
concluded that because the facts so closely aligned with past cases
implicating licensing, the Court should adhere to the Jackson precedent,
and not break any new ground in expanding the doctrine.164 Although
remedies under state law may remain available to the plaintiffs, there was
no First Amendment violation.165
C.

Justice Sotomayor Presents an Alternative View Supported by
Alternative Facts

From the first line of her dissent, Justice Sotomayor proclaimed that
she viewed the facts of the case to be different than those presented by
the majority.166 She believed that the facts showed that the public function
test was satisfied, and as such, MNN should have been treated as a public
forum subject to First Amendment protections.167 The dissent presented
two arguments regarding why the First Amendment should have applied
to MNN’s conduct.168 First, in mandating the creation of a public access
channel, the government had effectively created an easement.169 This
retained property right ensured that a channel such as MNN should be

158

Id.
Id. at 1930-31.
160 Id. at 1931-32.
161 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974).
162 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1931-32.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1932-33.
165 Id. at 1933.
166 Id. at 1934 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court tells a very reasonable story about a case
that is not before us. I write to address the one that is. This is a case about an organization appointed
by the government to administer a constitutional public forum.”).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1934–35, 1937.
159
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classified as a public forum.170 Second, New York could not avoid
constitutional protections simply by contracting the administration of a
public forum to a private company.171
D.

A Property Interest Was Created and Retained by New York City

The first argument is that an electronic property interest was retained
by New York City, which ensured that the public access channel
constituted a public forum.172 Comparing this interest to more tangible
property interests, Justice Sotomayor noted that this would be no different
than if New York City had licensed a private company to place a
billboard, but mandated what the content of that billboard would be.173
New York State law gave the City the right to bargain with the company
to operate a station under the terms specified in the contract, and these
terms ensured that the City retained an implied property interest which
could make the station liable.174 Justice Sotomayor also noted that under
this policy, the government would not have a property interest in all
public access channels—only channels where the City had specifically
bargained for these rights under an agreement with a cable company.175
Accordingly, New York City had the exclusive right to create a public
access channel, it retained this property interest when it authorized the
channel, and therefore, the channel was a public forum.176 This is
supported by the State’s mandate that all content be broadcasted on a
first-come, first-served basis.177
In Part III of the majority opinion, Justice Kavanaugh addressed the
dissent directly and held that New York City had no property interest in

170 Id. at 1937 (“The last time this Court considered a case centering on public-access channels,
five Justices described an interest like the one here as similar to an easement. Although Justice
Breyer did not conclude that a public-access channel was indeed a public forum, he likened the
cable company’s agreement to reserve such channels ‘to the reservation of a public easement, or a
dedication of land for streets and parks, as part of a municipality’s approval of a subdivision of
land.’” (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760-61
(1996))).
171 Id. at 1939–40 (“When MNN took on the responsibility of administering the forum, it stood
in the City’s shoes and became a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
172 Id. at 1937.
173 Id. at 1938-39.
174 Id. at 1937, 1939.
175 Id. at 1939 (“New York City gave Time Warner the right to lay wires and sell cable TV. In
exchange, the City received an exclusive right to send its own signal over Time Warner’s
infrastructure—no different than receiving a right to place ads on another’s billboards.”).
176 Id.
177 Id. (“New York State regulations require that the channels be made available to the public
‘on a first-come, first-served, nondiscriminatory basis.’” (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
16, § 895.4(c)(4), (8)-(9) (2020))).
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the public access channels.178 He considered the City to be essentially a
middleman between MNN and Time Warner—both private companies—
and wrote that because the agreement between Time Warner and New
York City never addressed a property interest, none was present.179 He
did note that the property interest argument may be possible depending
on state law, or the specific structure of a deal, and is not specifically
foreclosed by the opinion.180
E.

New York City’s First Amendment Obligations Transferred When
It Delegated the Work to a Private Entity

Justice Sotomayor’s second argument considered that a public
access channel run directly by New York City would unquestionably be
a public forum and that the City “cannot evade the First Amendment” by
assigning the administration of a public forum to a private entity.181 She
cited West v. Atkins,182 where a unanimous Court held that because North
Carolina was required to provide prisoners with medical care, failure to
properly treat a prisoner—even by an outside doctor—constituted state
action.183 Following this logic, the City had a constitutional obligation to
protect free speech, and this obligation did not extinguish because the
City was no longer the administrator of the station.184 In Justice
Sotomayor’s view, the protection had been delegated to the station
through the contract with the City.185 Therefore, the station had a duty to
comply with the First Amendment and ensure the public could use the
resources guaranteed by the City when it authorized the creation of the

178 Id. at 1933 (majority opinion) (“It does not matter that a provision in the franchise
agreements between the City and Time Warner allowed the City to designate a private entity to
operate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable system. Time Warner still owns the
cable system. And MNN still operates the public access channels. To reiterate, nothing in the
franchise agreements suggests that the City possesses any property interest in Time Warner’s cable
system, or in the public access channels on that system.”).
179 Id. at 1933-34.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1939–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
182 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
183 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1940 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing West, 487 U.S. 42).
184 Id. (“When a government (1) makes a choice that triggers constitutional obligations, and then
(2) contracts out those constitutional responsibilities to a private entity, that entity—in agreeing to
take on the job—becomes a state actor for purposes of § 1983.”).
185 Id. at 1941 (“The City could have done the job itself, but it instead delegated that job to a
private entity, MNN. MNN could have said no, but it said yes. (Indeed, it appears to exist entirely
to do this job.) By accepting the job, MNN accepted the City’s responsibilities. The First
Amendment does not fall silent simply because a government hands off the administration of its
constitutional duties to a private actor.” (internal citation omitted)).
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station.186 She disagreed with the majority that MNN had simply entered
the marketplace and was subject to regulations (rather than obligations)
of the City, which would not constitute state action per Jackson.187
Rather, MNN was offered a specific job, which carried certain
requirements—when MNN willingly entered into a contract with the
City,188 MNN had stepped into the City’s shoes so long as it used the
power delegated to it.189 Given her view that the facts presented by the
majority were not accurate, Justice Sotomayor would have found in favor
of Melendez and Halleck.190
F.

A Narrow Decision

The facts of Halleck—at least those presented as true by the
majority191—indicate that this should have been a relatively easy
decision.192 The categorization of a public access channel was still an
open question from Denver Area, but the general precedent for what
constituted state action had been defined by previous cases.193 In a
decision Justice Kavanaugh effectively labeled as narrow, the Court
provided a clear answer to Denver Area’s unresolved question.194 Yet,
186

Id.
Id. at 1942 (“More fundamentally, the majority’s opinion erroneously fixates on a type of
case that is not before us: one in which a private entity simply enters the marketplace and is then
subject to government regulation. The majority swings hard at the wrong pitch.”).
188 Id. at 1945 (“It was asked to do a job by the government and compensated accordingly.”).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1933 (majority opinion) (“The short answer to that argument is that the public access
channels are not the property of New York City. Nothing in the record here suggests that a
government (federal, state, or city) owns or leases either the cable system or the public access
channels at issue here. Both Time Warner and MNN are private entities. Time Warner is the cable
operator, and it owns its cable network, which contains the public access channels. MNN operates
those public access channels with its own facilities and equipment. . . . It does not matter that a
provision in the franchise agreements between the City and Time Warner allowed the City to
designate a private entity to operate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable system.
Time Warner still owns the cable system. And MNN still operates the public access channels. To
reiterate, nothing in the franchise agreements suggests that the City possesses any property interest
in Time Warner’s cable system, or in the public access channels on that system.”).
192 In that the facts presented seem to fall squarely into the Jackson framework, as outlined by
the majority. Id.
193 See id. at 1928-29 (outlining previous state action jurisprudence).
194 Id. at 1934 (“Having said all that, our point here should not be read too broadly. Under the
laws in certain States, including New York, a local government may decide to itself operate the
public access channels on a local cable system (as many local governments in New York State and
around the country already do), or could take appropriate steps to obtain a property interest in the
public access channels. Depending on the circumstances, the First Amendment might then
constrain the local government’s operation of the public access channels. We decide only the case
187
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per Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, this is not a narrow decision, but instead
a departure from previous cases.195
The facts of Halleck made it an easy case for the Court to reshape
the state action doctrine: the plaintiffs were banned because their
offensive conduct had made them toxic to a channel that was designed
for community use.196 It is difficult to argue that their belligerent actions
warranted anything less than a ban from airing a highly critical
documentary or any other inflammatory content.197 And yet, if the
plaintiffs were protected by the First Amendment, MNN would have no
choice but to put up with their conduct.
Controversial speech, no matter how outrageous, is protected.198 The
view endorsed by the dissent is in line with this—although MNN may not
have supported Halleck and Melendez’s programming, they were
compelled to broadcast the film given their position as administrators.199
The majority avoided this thorny issue by adopting the view that a public
access channel is more like a grocery store bulletin board than a private
election.200 Just as nobody would question a grocery store’s ability to
police content on their property, so should the channel have the right to
prevent problematic users from taking advantage of the community
service it provides.201

before us in light of the record before us.”). Justice Sotomayor disagreed with this assessment,
writing, “[w]hile the majority emphasizes that its decision is narrow and factbound, that does not
make it any less misguided.” Id. at 1945 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
195 See, e.g., id. at 1943 (“The Court made clear in West [v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)] that the
rule did not reach further, explaining that ‘the fact that a state employee’s role parallels one in the
private sector’ does not preclude a finding of state action. When the government hires an agent, in
other words, the question is not whether it hired the agent to do something that can be done in the
private marketplace too. . . . The majority consigns West to a footnote, asserting that its ‘scenario
is not present here because the government has no [constitutional] obligation to operate public
access channels.’” (last alteration in original) (citations ommited)).
196 See supra Section II.B.
197 Complaint at 11, Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238 (S.D.N.Y 2016) (No.
15-cv-08141) [hereinafter Halleck Complaint] (outlining a pattern of conduct which the station
considered harassment).
198 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“What Westboro said, in the whole context of
how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment, and
that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous.”).
199 Halleck Complaint, supra note 197, at 4-5 (noting that content had to be broadcast on a firstcome, first-served basis).
200 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930 (majority opinion) (“Therefore, a private entity who provides a
forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor. After all, private property
owners and private lessees often open their property for speech. Grocery stores put up community
bulletin boards.”).
201 Id.
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Justice Kavanaugh Makes His Mark

The opinion largely synthesizes the sometimes wavering history of
the state action doctrine into the easy to remember magic words Justice
Kavanaugh continually repeated.202 His strong adherence to past
precedent resulted in an extremely compelling opinion, especially when
viewed separately from the dissent.203 Although Justice Kavanaugh’s
“traditional, exclusive” language is a new addition, he does not appear, at
first glance, to have rewritten the doctrine in a meaningful way.204 After
all, previous state action claims could only arise under very limited
situations, many of which were addressed in Halleck.205 In dismissing the
initial suit, the district court found that this was close enough to Denver
Area to warrant dismissal.206 Justice Kavanaugh perhaps unnecessarily
oversimplified the analysis, and his willingness to distill a complicated
doctrine into a simple phrase now ensures that it will only cover a limited
number of functions—though this seems to be by design.207 The
majority’s repeated reminder of the importance of tradition208 represents
a quasi-originalist line of thinking that appears to foreclose the state
action doctrine’s applicability to functions that a public entity may adopt
moving forward.
One of the interesting aspects of this case is the stark contrast
between the majority opinion and the dissent—not just as a matter of law,
but as it pertains to the facts of the case before the Court.209 The
majority’s willingness to set aside facts that would have worked in the
plaintiff’s favor210 seems to indicate just how keen Justice Kavanaugh
was to change the law and announce a new test of his own. A final factor
that likely played a role in the makeup of the majority’s composition was
Justice Kavanaugh’s uncited paraphrase of Dennis Prager towards the

202 That is, the instance that the “traditional, exclusive public function” framework is the new
bright line rule. See generally id.
203 Id. at 1934 (“Under the text of the Constitution and our precedents, MNN is not a state actor
subject to the First Amendment.”).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1929. (“The Court has stressed that ‘very few’ functions fall into that category.”).
206 Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 245-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
207 It is difficult to tell how significant the outcome will be, however, as this doctrine was already
limited to so few functions. See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929 (“The Court has stressed that ‘very few’
functions fall into that category. Under the Court’s cases, those functions include, for example,
running elections and operating a company town.” (citations omitted)).
208 Id.
209 Compare id. at 1933–34 (majority opinion), with id. at 1934 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This
is particularly interesting as this comes from a motion to dismiss and should be viewed through the
lens of the facts alleged by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
210 Id. at 1934 (majority opinion).
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conclusion of the decision.211 Both the Denver Area decision and the line
of questioning Justice Breyer adopted during oral arguments indicate that
he was undecided as to whether the creation of a public access channel
constituted state action.212 The majority may have been able to bring more
votes to their side had Justice Kavanaugh not included such overtly profederalist society language favoring a limited government.213 Any
additional vote from the traditionally left-leaning justices was entirely
unnecessary, however, as a 5-4 decision on partisan lines is no less
binding than any other majority.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Future of the State Action Doctrine

In the short time since it was decided, Halleck has already been cited
in two high-profile cases protecting Google from § 1983 actions brought
against them—one from Tulsi Gabbard and the other from Halleckinfluencer Dennis Prager.214 Both cases paint Halleck as the definitive
decision on state action, yet neither required the rule established in
Halleck to reach its conclusion.215 Under pre-Halleck Ninth Circuit
precedent, an internet platform is not transformed into a state actor by
simply hosting speech.216 A court relying on previous decisions would
likely have reached the same result in either of these cases, without
needing to rely on the narrowed doctrine.217
211 Id. (“It is sometimes said that the bigger the government, the smaller the individual.”).
Although Justice Kavanaugh does not attribute this phrase, it is strikingly similar to one of Dennis
Prager’s aphorisms, “the bigger the government becomes, the smaller the individual citizen
becomes.” Dennis Prager, The Bigger the Government, the Smaller the Citizen, REAL CLEAR POL.
(Sept.
1,
2019),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/09/01/the_bigger_the_
government_the_smaller_the_citizen_98114.html [https://perma.cc/24JL-2VPG].
212 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC., 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Halleck
Transcript, supra note 126, at 24-25.
213 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/frequentlyasked-questions [https://perma.cc/5UAN-5R9A] (“[The Federalist Society] is an organization of
60,000 lawyers, law students, scholars, and other individuals who believe and trust that individual
citizens can make the best choices for themselves and society. It was founded in 1982 by a group
of law students interested in making sure that the principles of limited government embodied in our
Constitution receive a fair hearing.”).
214 Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020); Tulsi Now, Inc. v. Google, LLC,
No. 19-CV-6444, 2020 WL 4353686 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020). There is some irony as Dennis
Prager was responsible for the language used by the majority in Halleck, and yet was a victim of
its outcome.
215 Prager Univ., 951 F.3d 991; Tulsi Now, 2020 WL 4353686.
216 Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 997 (quoting Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
217 Id. at 997-98; Tulsi Now, 2020 WL 4353686, at *1-2.
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A recent Leading Case from the Harvard Law Review suggests the
possibility of a property interest as being an important aspect of the
decision.218 Although Justice Kavanaugh disagreed with Justice
Sotomayor that a property interest was retained by New York City, he did
not foreclose this from being an indication of state action in future
circumstances.219 Should a municipality wish to create a situation
wherein a public access channel must comply with the requirements of
the First Amendment, it could ensure that the authorization or contract
includes explicit reference to any property interest that may be
retained.220 While this interpretation may be possible, it appears more
likely that the mention of property interests was a platitude by the
majority to not completely ignore Justice Sotomayor’s alarm.221 This
outcome would almost certainly not be viable as it is unlikely that a
private television station would be interested in purposefully opening
themselves up to § 1983 suits if they accidentally censored content.
B.

A Narrow Decision?

Justice Kavanaugh’s “traditional, exclusive public function”222 test
simplifies a previously complex state action inquiry and will likely reduce
potentially frivolous litigation against private entities. Yet this advantage
comes at a steep price—although Justice Kavanaugh is careful to note
how narrow his opinion is, Halleck’s impact on public administration
cannot be understated, as the decision will shape the way public actors
structure future deals.223 Armed with a handbook on how to avoid
litigation, public actors can now take advantage of the decision to

218 Leading Case, Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 133 HARV. L. REV. 282, 288
(2019).
219 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019) (“Under the laws
in certain States, including New York, a local government may decide to itself operate the public
access channels on a local cable system (as many local governments in New York State and around
the country already do), or could take appropriate steps to obtain a property interest in the public
access channels. Depending on the circumstances, the First Amendment might then constrain the
local government’s operation of the public access channels. We decide only the case before us in
light of the record before us.”).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1933 (noting that both the plaintiff and the dissent addressed the question of property
rights).
222 Id. at 1934.
223 Halleck has already been cited as the controlling case on state action in over forty lower court
rulings. See, e.g., Grant v. Brooklyn Veterans Hosp., No. 19-CV-4875, 2019 WL 6254625, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2019) (outlining the new test as established in Halleck).
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circumvent constitutional protections.224 Thanks to Halleck, Justice
Douglas’s fear of a government and a private entity acting “in cahoots”
is more plausible than ever.225 After this decision, a government entity
could contract out work in fields that are not traditional and exclusive
public functions to avoid facing repercussions for actions that may not
comply with constitutional requirements.226 The next major case that
involves state action will likely build on this and might implicate rights
or services beyond a local TV station. Consider the increasingly popular
concept of municipal broadband.227 If a state actor had authorized a
private company to administer a public broadband network beyond a
mere licensing scheme, § 1983 actions might have been possible under
the Jackson framework.228 However, under Halleck, this remedy would
no longer be available as the administration of municipal broadband is
neither a traditional nor exclusive function of the government.229
Accordingly, a city could (for instance) authorize a municipal broadband
network and outsource the administration of the network to a third party,
which would have carte blanche to censor content as it saw fit.
This could be avoided had the Court adopted Justice Sotomayor’s
view, wherein New York City’s involvement in creating the channel was
enough to constitute state action, regardless of how traditional the
function implicated was.230 She anticipated a future where a government
entity would be able to contract out certain functions to escape liability

224 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1944 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“But two dangers lurk here
regardless. On the one hand, if the City’s decision to outsource the channels to a private entity did
render the First Amendment irrelevant, there would be substantial cause to worry about the
potential abuses that could follow. Can a state university evade the First Amendment by hiring a
nonprofit to apportion funding to student groups? Can a city do the same by appointing a
corporation to run a municipal theater? What about its parks?”).
225 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 363–64 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1941 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The City could have done the job itself,
but it instead delegated that job to a private entity, MNN. MNN could have said no, but it said yes.
(Indeed, it appears to exist entirely to do this job.) By accepting the job, MNN accepted the City’s
responsibilities. The First Amendment does not fall silent simply because a government hands off
the administration of its constitutional duties to a private actor.” (internal citation omitted)).
226 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1941.
227 Eric Griffith, Cheap and Fast Municipal ISPs Are Blocked in Almost Half of the US, PCMAG
(May 18, 2020), https://www.pcmag.com/news/cheap-and-fast-municipal-isps-are-blocked-inalmost-half-of-the-us [https://perma.cc/LB8T-94K2] (noting that there are 331 municipal
broadband networks in the United States according to one count). For an interactive map of
municipal broadband networks see Community Network Map, INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE,
https://muninetworks.org/communitymap [https://perma.cc/9SDR-8953].
228 Jackson, 419 U.S. 345 (finding that a regulatory scheme alone was not enough to constitute
state action).
229 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934 (majority opinion) (“Operating public access channels on a cable
system is not a traditional, exclusive public function. A private entity such as MNN who opens its
property for speech by others is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.”).
230 Id. at 1945 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

192

LIGHTS, CAMERA, STATE ACTION

[2020

or navigate around certain constitutional requirements, and crafted a
preemptive response to combat this situation.231 If Justice Kennedy had
remained on the Court, Halleck may have been decided differently,232 and
fears of a future where public actors can contract around constitutional
violations would be unfounded.233
When the case was first taken up, there was apprehension that a
ruling in favor of Halleck and Melendez could mean that internet
platforms and social media networks would be unable to censor any
content on their platforms, as they would be creating electronic public
squares.234 Nevertheless, Twitter’s decision to make an editorial
comment regarding the President’s remarks on mail-in ballots would
likely not have constituted a violation under Justice Sotomayor’s
framework,235 as Twitter has not contracted with the government to run
its forum, and there is no retained property right. In this instance, Twitter
would be properly categorized as being akin to a grocery store bulletin
board; a classification that is not appropriate (at least in Justice
Sotomayor’s view) for a public access channel chartered by the city.236
C.

State Action for Thee, Not for Me

During his tenure, President Trump has faced a great deal of
litigation.237 One such case arose from the President blocking users with
opposing viewpoints on Twitter, ensuring that neither would see each
other’s tweets and responses, at least when logged in.238 The district court
in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump
held that by blocking the plaintiffs, the President had infringed their First

231 Id. at 1940 (noting that prior to this decision, “[w]hen a government (1) makes a choice that
triggers constitutional obligations, and then (2) contracts out those constitutional responsibilities to
a private entity, that entity—in agreeing to take on the job—becomes a state actor for purposes of
§ 1983”).
232 See supra Section II.D.
233 See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1940 (addressing those fears).
234 Tucker Higgens, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear a Case that Could Determine Whether
Facebook, Twitter and Other Social Media Companies Can Censor Their Users, CNBC (Oct. 16,
2018, 1:24 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/16/supreme-court-case-could-decide-fb-twitterpower-to-regulate-speech.html [https://perma.cc/DY8U-4UV6].
235 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934.
236 See supra Section III.B.
237 Peter Baker, Trump is Fighting so Many Legal Battles, It’s Hard to Keep Track, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/politics/donald-trump-lawsuitsinvestigations.html [https://perma.cc/7NDR-JB96].
238 Jeffrey Toobin, Trump’s Twitter Blockees Go to Court, NEW YORKER (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/26/trumps-twitter-blockees-go-to-court
[https://perma.cc/8G64-PSVQ].
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Amendment rights.239 A three-judge panel on the Second Circuit affirmed
the decision,240 and en banc review was denied.241
On August 20, 2020, Trump petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari.242 In his petition, he invoked Halleck to support the argument
that he is not a state actor when using his personal Twitter account.243 His
tweets, however, seem to suggest a belief that Twitter is violating the First
Amendment when they flag his tweets as unsubstantiated.244 This leads
to the apparent suggestion—at least when comparing the petition with
Trump’s tweets—that the President is not a state actor, but Twitter is. The
Court has yet to reach a decision on the petition, leaving the future of the
Knight First Amendment Institute’s victory at the Second Circuit, and the
scope of Halleck, unwritten.
CONCLUSION
Although Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion is well reasoned and
grounded in strong precedent, it dangerously lays the groundwork for
future decisions by drawing a clear line on what constitutes state action.
The decision is especially problematic considering the majority and
dissent’s disagreement on the facts surrounding the case.245 Justice
Kavanaugh further widens the gulf by glossing over the legitimate
concerns presented by Justice Sotomayor.246 The overly narrow rule
239 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 577
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). The court determined that although “the
interactive space of a tweet sent by @realDonaldTrump is not a traditional public forum,” it was a
“designated public forum,” which was “subject to the same limitations as that governing a
traditional public forum.” Id. at 574–75 (citations omitted).

In sum, we conclude that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs as a result of the
political views they have expressed is impermissible under the First Amendment. While
we must recognize, and are sensitive to, the President’s personal First Amendment rights,
he cannot exercise those rights in a way that infringes the corresponding First
Amendment rights of those who have criticized him.
Id. at 577.
240 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
241 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 2020)
(denying en banc review).
242 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ.,
No. 20-197 (U.S. Aug 20, 2020).
243 Id. at 12-13 (“Here, those requirements are not satisfied: The President’s use of his own
property (his personal Twitter account) in a manner available to all private citizens (applying
Twitter’s blocking function) does not constitute state action to which the First Amendment
applies.”).
244 See Trump, supra note 1; TWITTER, supra note 4.
245 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019).
246 This can be inferred in light of Sotomayor’s view that the facts are so different from those
presented by the majority. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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appears to allow for situations where a public entity can contract with
private parties to purposefully circumvent constitutional protections that
would ordinarily apply.247 Justice Sotomayor makes a compelling case
for MNN to be considered a state actor, but her dissent would expand the
liability a private entity could face for civil rights violations in the course
of ordinary business, which could have a chilling effect on businesses.248
The application of both the majority and dissent present serious issues,
and there was likely a more sustainable opinion that could have been
written somewhere in the middle. Given his invocation of Conservative
aphorisms,249 however, it appears that Justice Kavanaugh perhaps cared
less about striking the consensus the Court reached in Denver Area, and
was instead looking to make his mark on the judiciary and build on the
legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist.250 What comes next is anybody’s
guess—Rehnquist used his own words from Jackson as a sword to narrow
the doctrine once more in Flagg Bros.251 If Justice Kavanaugh follows
the playbook of his “first judicial hero,”252 it stands to reason that he
might use the logic of Halleck to issue a new decision with broader
implications, which could lead to a further reduction in the remedies
available to those who have been wronged.

247

Id.
Id. at 1945.
249 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
250 See supra Section III.A.
251 See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978).
252 Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, On Abortion and Other Issues, Kavanaugh’s Heroes Are
More Conservative than Kennedy, WASH. POST (July 15, 2018, 6:40 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/on-abortion-and-other-issues-kavanaughsheroes-are-more-conservative-than-kennedy/2018/07/15/04a3975c-86ad-11e8-8553a3ce89036c78_story.html [https://perma.cc/27TH-YZYC].
248

